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ABSTRACT
This report (An Introduction to Safety) is the first in a nine-
part series of recommendations addressing the functional
safety of processor-controlled mining equipment.  It is part of
a risk-based system safety process encompassing hardware,
software, humans, and the operating environment for the
equipment's life cycle.  Figure 1 shows a safety framework
containing these recommendations.  The reports in this series
address the various life cycle stages of inception, design,
approval and certification, commissioning, operation, main-
tenance, and decommissioning.  These recommendations were
developed as a joint project between the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and
Health Administration.  They are intended for use by mining
companies, original equipment manufacturers, and aftermarket
suppliers to these mining companies.  Users of these reports
are expected to consider the set in total during the design
cycle.
•  1.0  Safety Introduction.—This is an introductory report
for the general mining industry.  It provides basic system/
software safety concepts, discusses the need for mining to
address the functional safety of programmable electronics, and
includes the benefits of implementing a system/software safety
program. 
•  2.1  System Safety and 2.2 Software Safety.—These
reports draw heavily from International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) standard 61508 and other recognized
standards.  The scope is "surface and underground safety
mining systems employing embedded, networked, and non-
networked programmable electronics."  System safety seeks to
design safety into all phases of the entire system.  Software is
a subsystem; thus, software safety is a part of the system's
safety.
• 3.0  Safety File.—This report contains the documentation
that demonstrates the level of safety built into the system and
identifies limitations for the system’s use and operation.  In
essence, it is a "proof of safety" that the system and its op-
eration meets the appropriate level of safety for the intended
application.  It starts from the beginning of the design, is main-
tained during the full life cycle of the system, and provides
administrative support for the safety program of the full
system.
1Electrical engineer.
2Senior research physical scientist.
3Supervisory research physical scientist.
Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Pittsburgh, PA.
2•  4.0  Safety Assessment.—The independent assessment of
the Safety File is addressed.  It establishes consistent methods
to determine the completeness and suitability of safety evidence
and justifications.  This assessment could be done by an
independent third party.
•  5.0  Safety Framework Guidance.—It is intended to
supplement the safety framework reports with guidance that
provides users with additional information.  The purpose is to
help users in applying the concepts presented.  In other words,
the safety framework is what needs to be done and the
guidance is how it can be done.  The guidance information
reinforces the concepts, describes various methodologies that
can be used, and gives examples and references.  It also gives
information on the benefits and drawbacks of various
methodologies.  The guidance reports are not intended to
promote a single methodology or to be an exhaustive treaty of
the subject material.  They provide information and references
so that the user can more intelligently choose and implement the
appropriate methodologies given the user's application and
capabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Equipment using programmable electronics (PE) control is
increasingly being used in many industrial applications because
of the many advantages brought by this technology to the
workplace.  These include the ability to handle more functions,
improved logic solving speed, and networking of com-
munications.  This in turn is resulting in added flexibility,
reduced cost, and improved product quality.  The use of PE
control in mining is an emerging technology.  The trend in using
PE controls for mining equipment is expected to increase
because mining's future depends on the use of new technologies.
As stated in the Wall Street Journal [Phillips 1997]:  "Mining,
that most basic of industries, is increasingly throwing down its
old tools and picking up new technology.  It's a matter of
survival."
This report is intended to create an awareness of the need for
safety planning from conception through decommissioning of
PE-based equipment used in mining applications.  Because of
the rapid increase in computerization of mining processes,
issues concerning the functional and operational safety of PE are
emphasized.  Functional and operational safety start at the
system level.  Safety cannot be ensured if efforts are focused
only on software.  The software can be totally free of "bugs" and
use numerous safety features, yet the equipment can be unsafe
because of how the software and all of the other parts interact in
the system.  In other words, the sum can be less safe than the
individual parts.
Thus, a system approach is needed.  How does one address
the safety of this system?  By making the system more reliable,
employing redundancy, or conducting extensive testing?  All of
these are necessary, but are not sufficient to ensure safety.
Making a system more reliable is not sufficient if the system has
unsafe functions.  What could result is a system that reliably
functions to cause unsafe conditions!  Employing redundancy is
not sufficient if both redundant parts are not safe.  Testing alone
is not sufficient for safety.  Studies show that testing does not
find all of the "bugs," and some systems are too complex to test
every condition.
The key to safety is to "design in" safety early in the design
by looking at the entire system, identifying hazards, designing
to eliminate or reduce hazards, and doing this over the system
life cycle.  More detailed information on system and software
safety is presented later in this report and in the references at the
end of this report.
NEED FOR MINING SAFETY LIFE CYCLE
The mining industry has been implementing PE technology
in mining control and monitoring systems to improve safety and
health, increase productivity, and improve mining's competitive
position.  While providing benefit to the mine operator, PE also
adds a level of complexity that, if not properly considered, may
adversely affect worker safety.  PE technology has unique
failure modes different from mechanical systems or hardwired
electronic systems traditionally used in mining.  Design
approaches that incorporate a system safety approach [Bennett
1995] are required to protect workers.
One example of PE in mining is computer-based monitoring
of the mine environment.  Underground mine environmental
monitoring and control began in the late 1970s and grew in the
1990s to where almost 17% [Francart et al. 1997] of all U.S.
underground coal mines have computer-based monitoring.
These atmospheric monitoring systems (AMS) monitor the mine
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     Figure 2.—Primary causes of failure for 34 industrial accidents
[Health and Safety Executive 1995].
environment for numerous items, including smoke, oxygen,
temperature, methane, carbon monoxide, and airflow.  The
central computer station for these systems is typically at a
surface location with cabling extended underground to a number
of remote sensors.  The central computer station collects data
from the sensors and presents the information to an attendant,
who can take action if monitored sensor data indicate a problem.
One of the most frequent applications of AMS in mining
involves the placement of carbon monoxide sensors along the
belt haulage entry for early warning of the presence of a fire in
that entry.  By installing such a system, a mine operator in some
cases4 may be able to use the belt haulage entry as an intake air
course to ventilate active face areas.  Normally, the belt entry
must be kept as a neutral air course.  The proper functioning of
the AMS is relied on to provide workers an early warning before
fire products are carried to the "face" where they are working.
Another example of PE in mining is the monitoring and
control of longwall mining roof supports.  PE-based control of
the roof support shield advancement process is found in almost
all U.S. longwalls today [Fiscor 1998].  This can exist in bank-
control mode where three adjoining shields are controlled
together from a single PE controller, or there may be multiple
PE controllers controlling all of the shields on the face.  Another
technology used in longwall mining is shearer-initiated
automatic roof support advancement.  Sensors are used to detect
shearer location, and these data are used by a PE controller to
advance the roof supports automatically.
Because PE control is an emerging technology in the mining
industry, the number of mishaps involving injury to human life
directly caused by a PE fault is very small.  However, an
increasing number of near misses and unexpected equipment
actions are being reported.  During 1996-98, eight mishaps
involving PE were recorded; four were fatal.  Mishaps and near
misses involving PE have also occurred before 1996.  The most
infamous involves longwall faces where PE-controlled longwall
roof support shields have been reported to move when the
operator did not expect it [Dransite 1992].  Similar situations
have been reported for other PE-controlled mining equipment.
The unexpected actions of PE-controlled mining equipment
can be attributed to the following:
Poor design caused by—
•  Inadequate safety requirement specification
•  Lack of software and hardware configuration management
•  Design errors
Improper operation caused by—
•  Lack of software and hardware configuration management
•  Lack of adequate and timely maintenance (e.g., malfunction-
ing position sensors and solenoid actuator valves)
•  Systematic errors (e.g., errors in design)
•  Sensor and actuator faults
4Granted by MSHA on a case-by-case basis under a petition for modification of
the application of a mandatory safety standard under section 101(c) of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.
•  Lack of or inadequate training of the operator (the operation
of the equipment is not completely understood)
•  Poor human-machine interface
Because the mining industry's experience with PE is
relatively small, lessons can be learned from other industries
that have confronted the issue of PE safety.  Therefore, we can
focus efforts on the most significant root causes of mishaps and
avoid repeating some of the same mistakes.  A number of
studies concur that most causes are traced to the safety
requirement specification for the system.  A study by Lutz
[1992] on National Aeronautics and Space Administration
software found that most problems with safety-related software
came from misunderstandings and discrepancies in the
requirement specification, i.e., inaccuracies, inadequacies, or
confusion in defining the behavior that the PE-controlled
equipment is desired to have.  A study by the Health and Safety
Executive [1995] in the United Kingdom of 34 mishaps
involving processor control in industrial applications found that
44.1% of the causes were attributed to the safety requirement
specification (figure 2).  The second leading cause at 20.6% was
attributed to changes after commissioning, i.e., mishaps caused
by hazard(s) unknowingly introduced by software modifications
after equipment is installed and operating.
PE faults can occur from hardware or software failures.
Hardware failures usually result from random events and wear.
They can involve any of the system components, programmable
electronic devices, power supplies, sensors, data communication
paths, actuators, etc.  Software does not exhibit random wear-
out failures.  Instead, software failures result from systematic
(logic or design) errors.  These failures affect system safety in
two ways [Leveson 1995]:  (1) output values and/or timing that
permits the system to reach a hazardous state or (2) failure to
identify or properly handle hazardous events to which it must
respond.
A worldwide effort by the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) is underway to integrate the safety life cycle
into sector-specific safety standards and guidelines.  The United
States is represented by individuals from various industry
sectors, such as the chemical process industry.  This effort is
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based on IEC 61508, a standard (in draft form as of this writing)
that addresses functional and operational safety [IEC 1998].  It
is generic and serves as the "master" from which industry-
specific standards are to be formed.  One such industry-specific
standard for the process industry is ANSI/ISA S84.01
[ANSI/ISA 1996].  At present, the mining industry has not
developed a mining sector safety life cycle for its use.  This
report introduces a safety life cycle approach for the mining
industry.
SYSTEM SAFETY SOLUTION OVERVIEW
The system safety concept can be traced back to 1947 where
the key concept was to have safety designed and built into the
system.  This concept has since evolved to address the safety of
complex, PE-based systems.  Leveson [1995] states:  "The
primary concern of system safety life cycle is the management
of hazards: their identification, evaluation, elimination, and
control through analysis, design and management procedures."
System safety life cycle emphasizes:
•  Integrating safety into the design
•  Systematic hazard identification and analysis
•  Addressing the entire system in addition to the subsystems
and components
•  Using protection layers for risk reduction
•  Qualitative and quantitative approaches
It is important from the very beginning of the mining
equipment design to take into account safety considerations
(design for safety) for the entire life cycle, including training,
installation, operation, maintenance, and upgrades.  Safety
considerations must not be an afterthought once the design is
completed.  To achieve this, a safety life cycle is constructed to
suit each application.  The safety life is explained in detail by
IEC 61508 [IEC 1998].  To present an overview of the general
concepts, we have generated a simplified version of the safety
life cycle (see figure 3) and have described the steps as follows:
(1) The first step in the safety life cycle is concerned with
gaining an understanding of the mining application, the
conceptual equipment design, and all parts of the system.  The
boundaries between the equipment under control, the control
system, and the people must be determined to establish the
system's scope.  Figure 4 shows the boundary of a basic
programmable electronic mining system.
(2) The second step involves identifying event sequences
leading to hazardous events and determining risks associated
with these events.
To be effective the hazard analysis process must be applied
over the life cycle of the system in a continual and iterative
manner.  That is, hazard identification and analysis start at the
conceptual stage of the project and continue on through the
definition, development, production, and deployment stages.
Leveson [1995] identifies three basic tasks in the hazard
analysis process:  (1) identify the hazard, (2) identify and
evaluate the hazard causal factors, and (3) evaluate risk.
Many techniques, ranging from simple qualitative to
advanced quantitative methods, are available to help identify
and analyze hazards.  The System Safety Analysis Handbook
[Stephans and Talso 1997] provides extensive listings and
descriptions.  Some examples of the more commonly used
techniques are the preliminary hazard list (PHL), preliminary
hazard analysis (PHA), hazard and operability study (HAZOP),
and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), which are
defined below.
Preliminary hazard list (PHL).—This is the first analysis
performed in the system safety process and strives to identify
critical system functions and broad system hazards.  It uses
historical safety data from similar systems and mishap/incident
5 Processors
 Sensors
 Actuators
  Operating Systems
  Application
  Documentation
  Operators
  Maintenance
  Management
Figure 4.—A basic programmable electronic mining system.
hazard logs to guide the safety effort until more system-specific
information is developed.
Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA).—This technique uses
the results of PHL, lessons learned, system and component
design data, safety design data, and malfunction data to identify
potential hazard areas.  In addition, its output includes ranking
of hazards by severity and probability, operational constraints,
recommended actions to eliminate or control the hazards, and
perhaps additional safety requirements.
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP).—This is a
systematic, detailed method of group examination to identify
hazards and their consequences.  Specific guide words are used
to stimulate and organize the thought process.  HAZOP
[Ministry of Defence 1998] has been adapted specifically for
systems using programmable electronic systems (PES).
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).—This technique
uses deductive logic to evaluate a system or process for safety
hazards and to assess risk.  It identifies the modes in which each
element can fail and determines the effect on the system.
Each hazard has associated risks.  The hazard identification
and analysis outcomes are used to evaluate risks, thus enabling
the relative importance and acceptability of each risk to be
determined.  Not all risks are equal, and some risks can be
acceptable.  For example, we accept a certain level of risk by
driving our cars.
Qualitative and quantative methods are used to assess risk.
One qualitative technique, shown by table 1, uses hazard
severity and frequency.  It aids users to systematically assess
risks and then focus efforts on the most significant risks.
(3) The third step involves specifying the safety-related
systems and protection layers needed to achieve the required
functional and operational safety.  The safety-related systems
are specified in terms of safety functions and safety integrity.
For some systems, a safety instrumented system (SIS) is added
to achieve higher levels of safety.  Other terms commonly used
include "emergency shutdown system," "safety shutdown
system," and "safety interlock system."  The SIS can be
composed of sensors, controllers (commonly called logic
solvers), and final control elements for the purpose of
preventing a hazardous event from occurring or taking the
mining system to a safe state when dangerous conditions exist.
For the safety-related system, both non-SIS and SIS protec-
tion layers are considered.  The desire is to first provide an
appropriate number of non-SIS protection layers.  If these do not
provide enough protection, then additional SIS protection layers
are required.  Figure 5 shows an example of protection layers.
(4) The fourth step assigns safety functions.  These are
intended to achieve and maintain a safe state.  Safety functions
can be implemented in hardware or software.  If these safety
functions are implemented by the SIS, then a safety integrity
level (SIL) is established for each safety function [ANSI/ISA
1996].
A safety function addressing an infrequent hazard that causes
minor safety consequences may not need to be implemented by
a SIS; thus, no SIL is assigned.  There are qualitative and
quantative methods to determine if an SIL is needed, and if so,
the associated SIL definition.  The SIL defines the level of
safety performance needed to achieve the user's mining safety
objective.  SILs are defined as 1, 2, and 3.  The higher the SIL,
the better the safety performance and the higher level of rigor
Table 1.— Example of a risk assessment matrix
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
Frequent A A A B
Probable A A A C
Occasional A B B C
Remote B C C D
Improbable C C C D
Mishap risk index
A
B
C
D
      Suggested criteria
Unacceptable
Undesirable
Acceptable with review
Acceptable without review
6Figure 5.—Example of protection layers for a mining system.
to achieve it.  For nuclear power applications, an SIL of 4
is typical.  For most industrial applications, a three-level SIL
is typical.  Safety performance is improved by adding re-
dundancy, more frequent testing, use of diagnostic fault
detection, use of different sensors and final control elements,
etc.  Safety performance is also improved through better control
of design, operation, maintenance procedures, and mine safety
management.
Associated with the SIL is probability of failure on demand
(PFD) average (see table 2).  This is a metric to measure safety
for the SIS.  It is the probability of the SIS failing when a
dangerous situation (the safety demand) occurs.  Another safety
metric is safety availability.  This is the percentage of time
during system operation that an SIS is able to perform protective
functions.  Safety availability equals 1 minus PFD.  An average
PFD for a given time period is used since PFD increases with
time.  In other words, PFD is very low if the system has
operated for 1 hour versus 1 year.
(5) The fifth step involves developing the safety-related
designs to meet the safety requirement specifications.  All sub-
systems and components that make up a system must be
considered in designing for safety.  These include the program-
mable electronic devices, power supplies, sensors, data com-
munication paths, actuators, the SIS, and the interaction of these
components.  The total system depends on all subsystems and
components to work properly.  A failure in one component may
cause a catastrophic system failure.  This step also includes the
generation of safety plans for overall safety validation, op-
eration, maintenance, and management of change.
(6) After installation, the commissioning and pre-startup
acceptance test shall be done.  Qualitative and quantitative
approaches are combined when assessing integrity.  Quantitative
approaches are fine when implemented by experienced
personnel (e.g., person with qualitative understanding).  Close
evaluation of qualitative versus quantitative shows that almost
all applications use both approaches, but in varying degrees.
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR) includes the following:
•  Verification that the SIS and non-SIS safety-related system
was constructed, installed, and tested in accordance with the
safety requirement specifications.
•  Safety, operating, maintenance, management of change,
and emergency procedures pertaining to the SIS and non-SIS
safety-related system are in place and adequate.
•  PHA recommendations that apply to the SIS have been
resolved or implemented.
•  Employee training has been completed and includes
appropriate information about the SIS.  Depending on the level
of interface required between the operator and the machine, the
PHA team may recommend that a simulator be available for
timely operator training "refreshment."
(7) SIS and non-SIS safety-related system operation and
maintenance procedures may be developed at any step of the
safety life cycle and shall be completed before startup.  If
modifications are proposed, their implementation shall follow a
management of change procedure.  The appropriate steps in the
safety life cycle shall be repeated to address the safety impact of
the change.
All of these steps require active participation from and
interaction with all members of the design team so that com-
ponents of the system are not designed in isolation.  The ef-
ficient, safe operation of a system requires that all components
be designed with the total system operation in mind.  The design
team must be familiar with the intended use of the product,
taking into account the environment in which it will operate.
Participation from the end user is also important up front in the
design stage so that the designer understands the needs of the
user and how the user plans to use the system and under what
conditions.
Table 2.—Safety integrity level (SIL) performance requirements
based on quantative criteria
SIL
1 2 3
Safety availability range . . . 0.9 to 0.99 0.99 to 0.999 0.999 to 0.9999
PFD average range . . . . . . 10&1 to 10&2 10&2 to 10&3 10&3 to 10&4
7 MINING EXAMPLE
Traditionally, mining incidents are viewed in the context of
near misses, injuries, and fatalities during operation and
maintenance.  The example presented here (see table 3) takes a
holistic view from beginning to end.  The purpose of this
example is to create an awareness of dangers posed to all
personnel that could have been averted if a system safety
approach had been applied during all phases of the life cycle.
After a mishap occurs, people are placed in dangerous situations
as they inspect, troubleshoot, move equipment, and make
repairs.  Secondly, this example shows that safe designs are not
Table 3.—Example of mine mishap scenario
Time Code People(cumulative) Narrative
DAY 1
8:30 a.m. . . . . . . NM 1 Machine moves unexpectedly, operator moves to escape.  No injury.
8:45 a.m. . . . . . . — 1 Mine personnel contacted:  Chief Mine Engineer, Maintenance Engineer, and Safety
Engineer.
10:00 a.m. . . . . . — 4 All mine personnel contacted arrive and begin troubleshooting.
10:45 a.m. . . . . . LTI 4 Maintenance person squats between machine and rib to read diagnostic display. 
Machine moves suddenly; person breaks arm trying to get out of the way.  Medical
assistance contacted.
10:50 a.m. . . . . . — 4 MSHA District Manager, State Inspector, United Mine Workers of America (UMWA),
and Field Service Engineer contacted.
12:30 p.m. . . . . . — 6 Medical assistance arrives; person is transported to hospital.
DAY 2
8:15 a.m. . . . . . . — 6 MSHA District Manager contacts mine, informing that MSHA will conduct a mishap
investigation.
12:00 noon . . . . — 11 MSHA District Accident Investigator, MSHA Technical Support, State Inspector,
UMWA, and Field Service Engineer arrive at the mine and begin working.
2:15 p.m. . . . . . . — 11 The process of duplicating the original problem of unexpected machine movement
begins once proper safety precautions are in place and test equipment is connected.
6:00 p.m. . . . . . . — 11 The problem is duplicated, and the pendant controller is identified as working
improperly.
6:15 p.m. . . . . . . — 13 MSHA takes pendant controller to laboratory for analysis.
DAY 3
9:30 a.m. . . . . . . — 13 During analysis, MSHA finds an open electrical connection in the remote-control
pendant.  MSHA also determines that the software contains an error, since it was
supposed to detect this condition.  Manufacturer is contacted.
10:30 a.m. . . . . . — 15 The manufacturer's hardware and software engineers determine that there is a
software bug.  The original software is compared with the existing software used
when the mishap occurred.  A safety-critical portion of software is missing.  The
software to detect and prevent the machine from going to an unsafe state is missing.
12:00 noon . . . . — 15 It is determined that the safety-critical portion of software was inadvertently omitted
due to the rush to meet the customer's demands that the software be modified to add
a new function by the next day.
3:15 p.m. . . . . . . — 16 MSHA Inspectorate issues a citation to the mine operator.
5:00 p.m. . . . . . . — 16 MSHA Technical Support initiates a Recall/Retrofit Program for these types of
pendant controllers. 
DAY 4
5:30 a.m. . . . . . . — 16 Begin to repair pendant hardware and write a new software patch.
6:00 a.m. . . . . . . — 16 Fixes are tested and have resolved the problem.
7:00 a.m. . . . . . . — 17 Meeting with mine management and all those directly involved takes place to explain
the problem and the proposed fix.
8:30 a.m. . . . . . . — 17 All parties satisfied with the proposed fix.
9:00 a.m. . . . . . . — 17 The manufacturer begins loading pendant memory chips with the new software.
DAY 5
8:30 a.m. . . . . . . — 17 Service Engineer arrives with replacement memory chips for the pendant controllers
and begins installation.
NM   Near miss.               LTI   Lost-time injury.
8limited to only the initial product design stage, but include the
need for safety processes when the system is modified.  In this
example, the software was modified before the mishap.  Soft-
ware is as much a part of the system as the hardware.  When
software is modified, one must analyze if the modification will
create a new hazard or worsen an existing one.  Lastly, mishaps
typically result from more than one cause.  In this case, hard-
ware, software, poor work practices, and poor management
practices combine, causing a lost-time injury to a maintenance
person.
This fictitious example is for informational purposes only.
It is a composite of actual events and is not intended to identify
particular people, manufacturers, or mine sites.  Time is
compressed for illustrative purposes.  In actuality, the scenario
could span 2-3 months or more.
Machine type:  Remote-controlled continuous miner
Time line:  8:30 a.m. start, finish, elapsed time ' 5 days
Event code:  Near miss (NM), lost-time injury (LTI)
Through a risk-based systems safety approach during all life
cycle phases, the injury could have been avoided, as well as the
time-consuming and costly activities that follow.  Specifically,
the causes and related safety life cycle steps to avert them are as
follows:
Day 1, 8:30 a.m.:  Unexpected machine movement is caused
by a combination of an open circuit (hardware fault), an error
introduced during the software modification (software error),
and the lack of a management of change plan (safety manage-
ment deficiency) for the software modification.
A management of change plan (see step 5 of the previous
section) could have averted the introduction of the software
error.  This plan manages system changes so that changes are
analyzed, reviewed, and well documented systematically and
safely.  The change analysis consists of a hazard and risk
analysis (see step 2 of the previous section) to determine the
safety effects on the system.  The review process is not done by
the person making the software change.  This independent
review increases the likelihood that error will not be overlooked.
For example, one person may view a change as insignificant, but
another could in fact determine that the change would create a
significant risk.  Documentation of previous safety-related
decisions is also very important to prevent people from in-
advertently undoing or omitting things during subsequent
modifications.
Day 1, 10:45 a.m.:  The maintenance person squats between
the machine and rib to read the diagnostic display.  For this
particular situation, this is a poor work practice because the
maintenance person is placing himself/herself in an area of
potential danger.  However, this person does not have any other
options, so he/she is essentially forced to place himself/herself
in this dangerous area in order to read the diagnostic display.
Therefore, the root cause of this problem is actually an in-
adequate design of the diagnostic display.  Step 2 of the
previous section (conduct a hazard and risk analysis) could have
identified this hazardous situation since the analysis is done for
all phases in the system, including maintenance activities.
BENEFITS OF MINING SAFETY LIFE CYCLE APPROACH
Mining safety life cycle is a good engineering practice that
results in improved safety, design, training, operation, and
maintenance of a mining process.  All participants (i.e., inte-
grator, user, supplier, regulatory authority) benefit from a safety
life cycle.  We may expect to see for each group the following
tangible benefits.
General mining industry:
•  Improves worker safety
• Provides a uniform and systematic approach to safety
management
•  Improves mine safety
• Improves design and reliability to increase quality and
throughput
•  Facilitates communication among all parties
Mine operator:
•  Improves worker safety
• Improves feedback channels to address safety issues and
training requirements
•  Reduces field modifications (improved safety specification,
resulting in a better design)
•  Higher uptime
•  Reduces exposure of operators and maintenance workers to
hazardous situations
•  Enhances support from manufacturer
Equipment manufacturer:
•  Reduces likelihood that hazardous designs continue in future
designs
•  Lowers support costs
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     Figure 6.—The impact of change during development and
operational phases.
•  Problems identified quickly (provides better diagnosis)
•  Product time to field reduced (facilitates approval process)
•  Reduced product liability costs (safer design)
•  R&D provided with qualitative and quantitative focus for new
product development (reduced false starts and reduced de-
velopment of unnecessary devices)
•  New business opportunities presented due to safer designs
•  Facilitates design changes early where costs are lower and
changes are easier (figure 6)
MSHA:
•  Provides invaluable information and documentation for
approval and certification
•  Provides invaluable information for investigations of
fatalities, injuries, and near misses
•  Gives essential techniques, methods, and insight required to
address the emerging technology of PE
Organized labor:
•  Gives security and knowledge that the membership's safety is
not compromised by new technologies.
GLOSSARY
Hazard.—Environmental or physical condition that can
cause injury to people, property, or the environment.
Human-machine interface.—The physical controls, input
devices, information displays, or other media through which a
human interacts with a machine in order to operate the machine.
Mishap.—An unplanned event or series of events resulting
in death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of
equipment or property, or damage to the environment [Ministry
of Defence 1998].  In the real world, complete freedom from
adverse events is not possible.  Therefore, the goal is to attain an
acceptable level of safety.
Probability of failure on demand (PFD).—A value that
indicates the probability of a system failing to respond on
demand.  The average probability of a system failing to respond
to a demand in a specified time interval is referred to as "PFD
avg."
Process hazard analysis team.—The group of operational,
mining, instrument/electrical/control, and safety specialists
responsible for the safety and integrity evaluation of the mining
process from its inception through its implementation and
transfer to mine operations to meet corporate safety guidelines.
Programmable electronics (PE).—Electrically or elec-
tronically programmable or configurable devices (e.g., em-
bedded controller, programmable logic controller, single-loop
digital controller, distributed control system controller) that are
effectively the "brain" of a programmable electronic system.
Programmable electronic system (PES).—Any system used
to control, monitor, or protect machinery, equipment, or facility
that has one or more programmable electronics (PE).  This
includes all elements of the system, such as power supplies,
sensors and other input devices, data highways and other
communications paths, and actuators and other output devices.
Programmable electronic mining system (figure 4).—
A mining system using PE that responds to input signals from
the equipment under control or from an operator and generates
output signals, causing the equipment under control to operate
in the desired manner.
Protection layer (figure 5).—Engineered safety features
or protective systems or layers that typically involve design for
safety in the equipment, administrative procedures, alarms,
devices, and/or planned responses to protect against an
imminent hazard.  These responses may be either automated or
initiated by human actions.  Protection should be independent of
other protection layers and should be user- and PHA-team
approved.
Safety.—Freedom from unacceptable risks.
Safety availability.—Fraction of time that a safety system is
able to perform its designated safety service when the process
is operating (PFD ' 1 & safety availability).
Safety instrumented system (SIS).—System composed of
sensors, logic solvers, and final control elements for the purpose
of taking the mining system to a safe state when predetermined
conditions are violated.  Other terms commonly used include
"emergency shutdown system," "safety shutdown system," and
"safety interlock system."
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Safety integrity level (SIL).—One of three possible discrete
integrity levels (SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3) of safety instrumented
systems.  SILs are defined in terms of probability of failure on
demand (PFD), where SIL 3 has the highest level of safety
integrity (see table 4).
Safety life cycle.—Sequence of activities involved in the im-
plementation of the safety instrumented systems from con-
ception through decommissioning.
Table 4.—SIL values
SIL
Probability of failure on demand
average range
(PFD avg.)
1 . . . . . . 10&1 to 10&2
2 . . . . . . 10&2 to 10&3
3 . . . . . . 10&3 to 10&4
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